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ABSTRACT
Tensor factorization has been demonstrated as an ecient approach
for computational phenotyping, where massive electronic health
records (EHRs) are converted to concise and meaningful clinical
concepts. While distributing the tensor factorization tasks to local
sites can avoid direct data sharing, it still requires the exchange
of intermediary results which could reveal sensitive patient infor-
mation. erefore, the challenge is how to jointly decompose the
tensor under rigorous and principled privacy constraints, while
still support the model’s interpretability.
We propose DPFact, a privacy-preserving collaborative tensor
factorization method for computational phenotyping using EHR. It
embeds advanced privacy-preserving mechanisms with collabora-
tive learning. Hospitals can keep their EHR database private but also
collaboratively learn meaningful clinical concepts by sharing dier-
entially private intermediary results. Moreover, DPFact solves the
heterogeneous patient population using a structured sparsity term.
In our framework, each hospital decomposes its local tensors, and
sends the updated intermediary results with output perturbation
every several iterations to a semi-trusted server which generates
the phenotypes. e evaluation on both real-world and synthetic
datasets demonstrated that under strict privacy constraints, our
method is more accurate and communication-ecient than state-
of-the-art baseline methods.
CCS CONCEPTS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) have become an important source
of comprehensive information for patients’ clinical histories. While
EHR data can help advance biomedical discovery, this requires an
ecient conversion of the data to succinct and meaningful patient
characterizations. Computational phenotyping is the process of
transforming the noisy, massive EHR data into meaningful medical
concepts that can be used to predict the risk of disease for an
individual, or the response to drug therapy. Phenotyping can be
used to assist precision medicine, speedup biomedical discovery,
and improve healthcare quality [24, 28].
Yet, extracting precise and meaningful phenotypes from EHRs
is challenging because observations in EHRs are high-dimensional
and heterogeneous, which leads to poor interpretability and re-
search quality for scientists [28]. Traditional phenotyping ap-
proaches require the involvement of medical domain experts, which
is time-consuming and labor-intensive. Recently, unsupervised
learning methods have been demonstrated as a more ecient ap-
proach for computational phenotyping. Although these methods
do not require experts to manually label the data, they require
large volumes of EHR data. A popular unsupervised phenotyping
approach is tensor factorization [15, 20, 27]. Not only can tensors
capture the interactions between multiple sources (e.g, specic
procedures that are used to treat a disease), it can identify patient
subgroups and extract concise and potentially more interpretable
results by utilizing the multi-way structure of a tensor.
However, one existing barrier for high-throughput tensor factor-
ization is that EHRs are fragmented and distributed among indepen-
dent medical institutions, where healthcare practises are dierent
due to heterogeneous patients populations. One of the reasons
is that dierent hospitals or medical sites dier in the way they
manage patients [30]. Moreover, eective phenotyping requires a
large amount of data to guarantee its reliance and generalizability.
Simply analyzing data from single source leads to poor accuracy
and bias, which would reduce the quality and eciency of patients’
care.
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Recent studies have suggested that the integration of health
records can provide more benets [12], which motivated the appli-
cation of federated tensor learning framework [20]. It can mitigate
privacy issues under the distributed data seing while achieves
high global accuracy and data harmonization via federated com-
putation. But this method has inherent limitations of federated
learning: 1) high communication cost; 2) reduced accuracy due to
local non-IID data (i.e., patient heterogeneity); and 3) no formal
privacy guarantee of the intermediary results shared between local
sites and the server, which makes patient data at risk of leakage.
In this paper, we propose DPFact, a dierentially private collab-
orative tensor factorization framework based on Elastic Averaging
Stochastic Gradient Descent (EASGD) for computational phenotyp-
ing. DPFact assumes all sites share a common model which can be
learnt jointly from each site through communication with a central
parameter server. Each site performs its own tensor factorization
task to discover both common and distinct latent components, while
beneting from the intermediary results generated by other sites.
e intermediary results uploaded still contain sensitive informa-
tion about the patients. Several studies have shown that machine
learning models can be used to extract sensitive information used
in the input training data through membership inference aacks
or model inversion aacks both in the centralized seing [11, 25]
and federated seing [14]. Since we assume the central server and
participants are honest-but-curious, hence a formal dierential pri-
vacy guarantee is desired. DPFact tackles the privacy issue with
a well-designed data-sharing strategy, combined with the rigor-
ous zero-concentrated dierential privacy (zCDP) technique [9, 33]
which is a strictly stronger denition than (ϵ,δ )-dierential privacy
considered as the dominant standard for strong privacy protection
[8–10]. We briey summarize our contributions as:
1) Eciency. DPFact achieves higher accuracy and faster con-
vergence rate than the state-of-the-art federated learning method.
It also beats the federated learning method in achieving lower com-
munication cost thanks to the elimination of auxiliary parameters
(e.g., in the ADMM approach) and allows each local site to perform
most of the computation.
2) Utility. DPFact supports phenotype discovery even with a
rigorous privacy guarantee. By incorporating a l2,1 regularization
term, DPFact can jointly decompose local tensors with dierent
distribution paerns and discover both the globally shared and the
distinct, site-specic phenotypes.
3) Privacy. DPFact is a privacy-preserving collaborative tensor
factorization framework. By applying zCDP mechanisms, it guar-
antees that there is no inadvertent patient information leakage in
the process of intermediary results exchange with high probability
which is quantied by privacy parameters.
We evaluate DPFact on two publicly-available large EHR datasets
and a synthetic dataset. e performance of DPFact is assessed
from the following three aspects including eciency measured by
accuracy and communication cost, utility measured by phenotype
discovery ability and the evaluation on the eect of privacy.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
is section describes the preliminaries used in this paper, including
tensor factorization, (ϵ,δ )-dierential privacy, and zCDP.
Symbols Descriptions
⊗ Kronecker product
 Khatri-Rao product
◦ Outer Product
∗ Element-wise Product
N Number of modes
T Number of local sites
R Number of ranks
X(n) n-mode matricization of tensor O
X,X,x Tensor, matrix, vector
B̂, Ĉ Global factor matrices
A[t ],B[t ],C[t ] Local factor matrices at the t-th site
X[t ] Local tensor at the t-th site
xi :,x:r Row vector, Column vector
Table 1: Symbols and Notations
2.1 Tensor Factorization
Denition 2.1. (Khatri-Rao product). Khatri-Rao product is the
“columnwise” Kronecker product of two matrices A ∈ RI×R and
B ∈ RJ×R . e result is a matrix of size (I J × R) and dened by
A  B = [a1 ⊗ b1 · · · aR ⊗ bR ]
Here, ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. e Kronecker product of
two vectors a ∈ RI , b ∈ RJ is
a ⊗ b =

a1b
...
aI b

Denition 2.2. (CANDECOMP-PARAFAC Decomposition). e
CANDECOMP-PARAFAC (CP) decomposition is to approximate
the original tensor O by the sum of R rank-one tensors. R is the
rank of tensor O, It can be expressed as
O ≈ X =
R∑
r=1
a(1):r ◦ · · · ◦ a(N ):r , (1)
where a(n):r represents the r th column of A(n) for n = 1, · · · ,N
and r = 1, · · · ,R. A(n) is the n-mode factor matrix consisting of
R columns representing R latent components which can be repre-
sented as
A(n) =
[
a(n):1 · · · a
(n)
:R
]
,
so that A(n) is of size In × R for n = 1, · · · ,N , and the equation of
(1) can also be represented as
[[A(1), · · · ,A(N )]] =
R∑
r=1
a(1):r ◦ · · · ◦ a(N ):r . (2)
Note that in this formulation, the scalar weights for each rank-one
tensor are assumed to be absorbed into the factors.
In the way of a three-mode tensor O ∈ RI×J×K , the CP decom-
position can be represented as
O ≈ X =
R∑
r=1
a:r ◦ b:r ◦ c:r , (3)
where a:r ∈ RI , b:r ∈ RJ , c:r ∈ RK are the r -th column vectors
within the three factor matrices A ∈ RI×R , B ∈ RJ×R , C ∈ RK×R .
2.2 Dierential Privacy
Dierential privacy [8, 9] has been demonstrated as a strong stan-
dard to provide privacy guarantees for algorithms on aggregate
database analysis, which in our case is a collaborative tensor fac-
torization algorithm analyzing distributed tensors with dierential
privacy.
Denition 2.3. ((ϵ-δ )-Dierential Privacy) [8]. Let D and D ′
be two neighboring datasets that dier in at most one entry. A
randomized algorithmA is (ϵ-δ )-dierentially private if for all S ⊆
Range(A):
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eϵPr [A(D ′) ∈ S] + δ ,
where A(D) represents the output of A with an input of D.
e above denition suggests that with a small ϵ , an adversary
almost cannot distinguish the outputs of an algorithm with two
neighboring datasets D and D ′ as its inputs. While δ allows a
small probability of failing to provide this guarantee. Dierential
privacy is dened using a pair of neighboring databases which in
our work are two tensors and dier in only one entry.
Denition 2.4. (L2-sensitivity) [8]. For two neighboring datasets
D and D ′ diering in at most one entry, the L2-sensitivity of an
algorithm A is the maximum change in the l2-norm of the output
value of algorithm A regarding the two neighboring datasets:
∆2(A) = sup
D,D′
‖A(D) − A(D ′)‖2.
Theorem 2.5. ((Gaussian Mechanism)) [8]. Let ϵ ∈ (0, 1) be arbi-
trary. For c2 > 2 ln(1.25/δ ), the Gaussian Mechanism with parameter
σ ≥ c∆2(A)/ϵ , adding noise scaled to N(0,σ 2) to each component
of the output of algorithm A, is (ϵ-δ )-dierentially private.
2.3 Concentrated Dierential Privacy
Concentrated dierential privacy (CDP) is introduced by Dwork
and Rothblum [9] as a generalization of dierential privacy which
provides sharper analysis of many privacy-preserving computa-
tions. Bun and Steinke [4] propose an alternative formulation of
CDP called ”zero-concentrated dierential privacy” (zCDP) which
utilizes the Re´nyi divergence between probability distributions to
measure the requirement of the privacy loss random variable to be
sub-gaussian and provides tighter privacy analysis.
Denition 2.6. (Zero-Concentrated Dierential Privacy (zCDP) [4])
A randomized mechanism A is ρ-zero concentrated dierentially
private if for any two neighboring databases D and D ′ diering
in at most one entry and all α ∈ (1,∞),
Dα
(A(D)‖A (D ′) ) , 1
α − 1 log
(
E
[
e(α−1)L(o)
] )
≤ ρα ,
where Dα (A(D)‖A (D ′)) is called α-Re´nyi divergence between
the distributions of A(D) and A (D ′), and L(o) is the privacy loss
random variable which is dened as:
L
(o)
(A(D)| |A(D′)) , log
Pr(A(D) = o)
Pr (A (D ′) = o) .
e following propositions of zCDP will be used in this paper.
Proposition 2.7. [4]eGaussianmechanismwith noiseN(0,σ 2)
where σ =
√
1/(2ρ)∆2 satises ρ-zCDP.
Proposition 2.8. [4] If a randomized mechanism A is ρ-CDP,
then A is (ϵ ′, δ )-DP for any δ with ϵ ′ = ρ + √4ρ log(1/δ ); For A to
satisfy (ϵ,δ )-DP, it suces to satisfy ρ-zCDP by seing ρ ≈ ϵ 24 log(1/δ ) .
Proposition 2.9. ((Serial composition [4])) Let A : Dn → Y
andA ′ : Dn →Z be randomized algorithms. SupposeA is ρ-zCDP
and A ′ is ρ ′-zCDP. Dene A ′′ : Dn → Y ×Z by A ′′ = (A,A ′).
en A ′′ is (ρ + ρ ′)-zCDP.
Proposition 2.10. ((Parallel composition [33])) Suppose that a
mechanism A consists of a sequence of T adaptive mechanisms,
A1, . . . ,AT , where each At : Πiter−1j=1 Oj × Dt → Oiter and At
satises ρt -zCDP. Let D1, . . . ,DT be a randomized partition of the
input D. e mechanism A(D) = (A1 (D1) , . . . ,AT (DT )) satis-
es 1T
∑T
t=1 ρt -zCDP.
3 DPFACT
In this section, we rst provide a general overview and then present
detailed formulation of the optimization problem.
3.1 Overview
DPFact is a distributed tensor factorization model that preserves
dierential privacy. Our goal is to learn computational phenotypes
from horizontally partitioned patient data (e.g., each hospital has
its own patient data with the same medical features). Since we
assume the central server and participants are honest-but-curious
which means they will not deviate from the prescribed protocol
but they are curious about others secrets and try to nd out as
much as possible about them. erefore the patient data cannot be
collected at a centralized location to construct a global tensor O.
Instead, we assume that there are T local sites and a central server
that communicates the intermediary results between the local sites.
Each site performs tensor factorization on the local data and shares
privacy-preserving intermediary results with the centralized server
(Figure 1).
Figure 1: Algorithm Overview
e patient data at each site is used to construct a local observed
tensor, O[t ]. For simplicity and illustration purposes, we discuss
a three-mode tensor situation where the modes are patients, pro-
cedures, and diagnoses but DPFact generalizes to N modes. e T
sites jointly decompose their local tensor into three factor matrices:
a patient factor matrix A[t ] and two feature factor matrices B[t ]
and C[t ]. We assume that the factor matrices on the non-patient
modes (i.e., B[t ],C[t ]) are the same across the T sites, thus sharing
the same computational phenotypes. To achieve consensus of the
shared factor matrices, the non-patient feature factor matrices are
shared in a privacy-preserving manner with the central server by
adding Gaussian noise to each uploaded factor matrix.
Although the collaborative tensor problem for computational
phenotyping has been previously discussed [20], DPFact provides
three important contributions:
(1) Eciency: We adopt a communication-ecient stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) algorithm for collaborative learning which
allows each site to transmit less information to the centralized
server while still achieving an accurate decomposition.
(2) Heterogeneity: A traditional global consensus model re-
quires learning the same shared model from multiple sources. How-
ever, dierent data sources may have distinct paerns and proper-
ties (e.g., disease prevalence may dier between Georgia and Texas).
We propose using the l2,1-norm to achieve global consensus among
the sites while capturing site-specic factors.
(3) Dierential Privacy Guarantees: We preserve the privacy
of intermediary results by adding Gaussian noise to each non-
patient factor matrix prior to sharing with the parameter server.
is masks any particular entry in the factor matrices and prevents
inadvertent privacy leakage. A rigorous privacy analysis based
on zCDP is performed to ensure strong privacy protection for the
patients.
3.2 Formulation
Under a single (centralized) model, CP decomposition of the ob-
served tensor O results in a factorized tensor X that contains the R
most prevalent computational phenotypes. We represent the cen-
tralized tensor as T separate horizontal partitions, O[1], · · · ,O[T ].
us, the global function can be expressed as the sum ofT separable
functions with respect to each local factorized tensor X[t ] [20]:
min
X
L = 12 | |O − X||
2
F =
T∑
t=1
1
2
O[t ] − X[t ]2
F
. (4)
Since the goal is to uncover computational phenotypes that are
shared across all sites, we restrict the sites to factorize the observed
local tensors O[t ] such that the non-patient factor matrices are the
same. erefore, the global optimization problem is formulated as:
min
T∑
t=1
1
2
O[t ] − [[A[t ],B[t ],C[t ]]]2
F
s.t. B[1] = B[2] = · · · = B[T ]
C[1] = C[2] = · · · = C[T ].
is can be reformulated as a global consensus optimization,
which decomposes the original problem into T local subproblems
by introducing two auxiliary variables, Bˆ, Cˆ, to represent the global
factor matrices. A quadratic penalty is placed between the local
and global factor matrices to achieve global consensus among the
T dierent sites. us, the local optimization problem at site t is:
min 12
O[t ] − [[A[t ],B[t ],C[t ]]]2
F
+
γ
2
B[t ] − Bˆ2
F
+
γ
2
C[t ] − Cˆ2
F
.
(5)
3.3 Heterogeneous Patient Populations
e global consensus model assumes that the patient populations
are the same across dierent sites. However, this may be too restric-
tive as some locations can have distinctive paerns. For example,
patients from the cardiac coronary unit may have unique character-
istics that are dierent from the surgical care unit. DPFact utilizes
the l2,1-norm regularization, to allow exibility for each site to
“turn o” one or more computational phenotypes. For an arbitrary
matrix W ∈ Rm×n , its l2,1-norm is dened as:
‖W‖2,1 =
m∑
i=1
√√ n∑
j=1
W2i j . (6)
From the denition, we can see that the l2,1-norm controls the row
sparsity of matrix W. As a result, the l2,1-norm is commonly used
in multi-task feature learning to perform feature selection as it can
induce structural sparsity [13, 21, 23, 31].
DPFact adopts a multi-task perspective, where each local de-
composition is viewed as a separate task. Under this approach,
each site is not required to be characterized by all R computational
phenotypes. To achieve this, we introduce the l2,1-norm on the
transpose of the patient factor matrices, A[t ], to induce sparsity
on the columns. e idea is that if a specic phenotype is barely
present in any of the patients (2-norm of the column is close to
0), the regularization will encourage all the column entries to be
0. is can be used to capture the heterogeneity in the patient
populations without violating the global consensus assumption.
us the DPFact optimization problem is:
min
T∑
t=1
(12
O[t ] − [[A[t ],B[t ],C[t ]]]2
F
+
γ
2
B[t ] − Bˆ2
F
+
γ
2
C[t ] − Cˆ2
F
+ µ
(A[t ])>
2,1
).
(7)
e quadratic penalty, γ , provides an elastic force to achieve global
consensus between the local factor matrices and the global factor
matrices whereas the l2,1-norm penalty, µ, encourages sites to share
similar sparsity paerns.
4 DPFACT OPTIMIZATION
DPFact adopts the Elastics Averaging SGD (EASGD) [34] approach
to solve the optimization problem (7). EASGD is a communication-
ecient algorithm for collaborative learning and has been shown
to be more stable than the Alternating Direction Method of Mul-
tipliers (ADMM) with regard to parameter selection. Moreover,
SGD-based approaches scale well to sparse tensors, as the compu-
tation is bounded by the number of non-zeros.
Using the EASGD approach, the global consensus optimization
problem is solved alternatively between the local sites and the
central server. Each site performs multiple rounds of local tensor
decomposition and updates their local factor matrices. e site
then only shares the most updated non-patient mode matrices with
output perturbation to prevent revealing of sensitive information.
e patient factor matrix is never shared with the central server
to avoid direct leakage of patient membership information. e
server then aggregates the updated local factor matrices to update
the global factor matrices and sends the new global factor matrices
back to each site. is process is iteratively repeated until there are
no changes in the local factor matrices. e entire DPFact decom-
position process is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: DPFact
Input: O, τ η, γ , µ, σ , ρ.
1 Randomly initialize the global feature factor matrices B, C and
local feature factor matrices B[t ], C[t ].
2 while B[t ], C[t ] not converge do
3 if Hospital then
4 for k = 1, · · · ,τ do
5 Shue tensor elements;
6 for observation i do
7 Update A[t ] using (13);
8 Update B[t ], C[t ] using (17);
9 end
10 Proximal update for newA[t ] using (14);
11 end
12 Calibrate Gaussian noise matrixM[t ]B andM
[t ]
C as N
(0,∆22/(2ρ)) for each factor matrix;
13 Update factor matrices pr ivB[t ] and pr ivC[t ] using
(18);
14 Send pr ivB[t ], pr ivC[t ] to Server.
15 end
16 if Server then
17 Collect pr ivB[t ], pr ivC[t ] from each hospital;
18 Update B̂, Ĉ using (19);
19 Send B̂, Ĉ back to hospitals.
20 end
21 end
4.1 Local Factors Update
Each site updates the local factors by solving the following sub-
problem:
min 12
O[t ] − [[A[t ],B[t ],C[t ]]]2
F
+
γ
2
B[t ] − Bˆ2
F
+
γ
2
C[t ] − Cˆ2
F
+ µ
(A[t ])>
2,1
.
(8)
EASGD helps reduce the communication cost by allowing sites
to perform multiple iterations (each iteration is one pass of the
local data) before sending the updated factor matrices. We further
extend the local optimization updates using permutation-based
SGD (P-SGD), a practical form of SGD [29]. In P-SGD, instead of
randomly sampling one instance from the tensor at a time, the non-
zero elements are rst shued within the tensor. e algorithm
then cycles through these elements to update the latent factors. At
each local site, the shuing and cycling process is repeated τ times,
hereby referred to as a τ -pass P-SGD. ere are two benets of
adopting the P-SGD approach: 1) the resulting algorithm is more
computationally eective as it eliminates some of the randomness
of the basic SGD algorithm. 2) it provides a mechanism to properly
estimate the total privacy budget (see Section 4.2).
4.1.1 Patient Factor Matrix. For site t , the patient factor matrix
A[t ] is updated by minimizing the objective function using the local
factorized tensor, X[t ] and the l2,1-norm:
min
A[t ]
1
2
O[t ] − [[A[t ],B[t ],C[t ]]]2
F︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
F
+ µ
(A[t ])>
2,1︸           ︷︷           ︸
H
. (9)
While the l2,1-norm is desirable from a modeling perspective, it
also results in a non-dierentiable optimization problem. e local
optimization problem (9) can be seen as a combination of a dif-
ferentiable function F and a non-dierentiable functionH . us,
we propose using the proximal gradient descent method to solve
local optimization problem for the patient mode. Proximal gradient
method can be applied in our case since the gradient of the dieren-
tiable function F is Lipschitz continuous with a Lipschitz constant
L (see Appendix for details).
Using the proximal gradient method, the factor matrix A[t ] is
iteratively updated via the proximal operator:
newA[t ] = proxηH
(
A[t ] − η∇F (A[t ])
)
, (10)
where η > 0 is the step size at each local iteration. e proximal
operator is computed by solving the following equation:
proxηH(Θ) = arg min
Θ
(
1
2η ‖Θ − Θˆ‖ +H(Θ)
)
, (11)
where Θˆ = A[t ] − η∇F (A[t ]) is the updated matrix. It has been
shown that if ∇F is Lipschitz continuous with constant L, the
proximal gradient descent method will converge for step size η <
2/L [7]. For the l2,1-norm, the closed form solution can be computed
using the so-thresholding operator:
proxηH(Θ̂) = Θ̂r :
(
1 − µ
‖Θ̂r :‖ 2
)
+
, (12)
where r ∈ (0,R] and r represents the r -th column of the factor
matrix Θ̂, and (z)+ denotes the maximum of 0 and z. us, if the
norm of the r -th column of the patient matrix is small, the proximal
operator will “turn o” that column.
e gradient of the smooth part can be derived with respect to
each row in the patient mode factor matrix, A[t ]. e update rule
for each row is:
a[t ]i : ← a
[t ]
i : − η
[(
a[t ]i : (b
[t ]
j : ∗ c
[t ]
k : )
> − O[t ]i jk
) (
b[t ]j : ∗ c
[t ]
k :
)]
(13)
Aer one pass through all entries in a local tensor to update the
patient factor matrix, the second step is to use proximal operator
(12) to update the patient factor matrix A[t ]:
newA[t ] = proxηH(A[t ]). (14)
4.1.2 Feature Factor Matrices. e local feature factor matri-
ces, B[t ] and C[t ], are updated based on the following objective
functions:
min
B[t ]
fb =
1
2
O[t ] − [[A[t ],B[t ],C[t ]]]2
F
+
γ
2
B[t ] − Bˆ2
F
,
min
C[t ]
fc =
1
2
O[t ] − [[A[t ],B[t ],C[t ]]]2
F
+
γ
2
C[t ] − Cˆ2
F
.
(15)
e partial derivatives of fb , fc with respect to b
[t ]
j : and c
[t ]
k : , the
j-th and k-th row of the B[t ] and C[t ] factor matrices, respectively,
are computed.
∂ fb
∂b[t ]j :
=
[(
a[t ]i : (b
[t ]
j : ∗ c
[t ]
k : )
> − O[t ]i jk
) (
a[t ]i : ∗ c
[t ]
k :
)]
∂ fc
∂c[t ]k :
=
[(
a[t ]i : (b
[t ]
j : ∗ c
[t ]
k : )
> − O[t ]i jk
) (
a[t ]i : ∗ b
[t ]
j :
)]
.
(16)
B[t ] and C[t ] are then updated row by row by adding up the partial
derivative of the quadratic penalty term and the partial derivative
with respect to b[t ]j : and c
[t ]
k : shown in (16).
b[t ]j : ← b
[t ]
j : − η

∂ fn
∂b[t ]j :
+ γ
(
b[t ]j : − b̂j :
) ;
c[t ]k : ← c
[t ]
k : − η

∂ fn
∂c[t ]k :
+ γ
(
c[t ]k : − ĉk :
) .
(17)
Each site simultaneously does several rounds (τ ) of the local
factor updates. Aer τ rounds are completed, the feature factor
matrices will be perturbed with Gaussian noise and sent to central
server.
4.1.3 Privacy-Preserving Output Perturbation. Although the fea-
ture factor matrices do not directly contain patient information,
it may inadvertently violate patient privacy (e.g., a rare disease
that is only present in a small number of patients). To protect the
patient information from being speculated by semi-honest server,
we perturb the feature mode factor matrices using the Gaussian
mechanism, a common building block to perturb the output and
achieve rigorous dierential privacy guarantee.
e Gaussian mechanism adds zero-mean Gaussian noise with
standard deviation σ = ∆22/(2ρ) to each element of the output
[4]. us, the noise matrixM can be calibrated for each factor
matrices B[t ] and C[t ] based on their L2-sensitivity to construct
privacy-preserving feature factor matrices:
pr ivB[t ] ← B[t ] +M[t ]B ,
pr ivC[t ] ← C[t ] +M[t ]C ,
(18)
As a result, each factor matrix that is shared with the central server
satises ρ-zCDP by Proposition 2.7. A detailed privacy analysis for
the overall privacy guarentee is provided in the next subsection.
4.2 Privacy Analysis
In this section we analyze the overall privacy guarantee of Algo-
rithm 1. e analysis is based on the following knowledge of the
optimization problem: 1) each local site performs a τ -pass P-SGD
update per epoch; 2) for the local objective function f in (15), when
xing two of the factor matrices, the objective function becomes a
convex optimization problem for the other factor matrix.
4.2.1 L2-sensitivity. e objective function (15) satises L −
Lipschitz, with Lipschitz constant L the tight upper bound of the
gradient. For a τ -pass P-SGD, having constant learning rate η =
ηk ≤ 2β (k = 1, ...,τ , β is the Lipschitz constant of the gradient
of (15) regarding B[t ] or C[t ], see Appendix for β calculation), the
L2-sensitivity of this optimization problem in (15) is calculated as
∆2(f ) = 2τLη [29].
4.2.2 Overall Privacy Guarantee. e overall privacy guarantee
of Algorithm 1 is analyzed under the zCDP denition which pro-
vides tighter privacy bound than strong composition theorem [10]
for multiple folds Gaussian mechanism [4, 33]. e total ρ-zCDP
will be transferred to (ϵ,δ )-DP in the end using Proposition 2.8.
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 1 is (ϵ,δ )-dierentially private if we
choose the input privacy budget for each factor matrix per epoch as
ρ =
ϵ2
8E log(1/δ )
where E is the number of epochs when the algorithm is converged.
Proof. Let the ”base” zCDP parameter be ρb , B[t ] and C[t ]
together cost 2Eρb aer E epochs by Proposition 2.9. All T user
nodes cost 1T
∑T
t=1 2Eρb = 2Eρb by the parallel composition theorem
in Proposition 2.10. By the connection of zCDP and (ϵ,δ )-DP in
Proposition 2.8, we get ρb = ϵ
2
8E log(1/δ ) , which concludes our proof.

4.3 Global Variables Update
e server receivesT local feature matrix updates, and then updates
the global feature matrices according to the same objective function
in (5). e gradient for the global feature matrices B̂ and Ĉ are:
B̂← B̂ + η
T∑
t=1
γ
(
pr ivB[t ] − B̂
)
Ĉ← Ĉ + η
T∑
t=1
γ
(
pr ivC[t ] − Ĉ
)
.
(19)
e update makes the global phenotypes similar to the local phe-
notypes at the T local sites. e server then sends the global infor-
mation, B̂, Ĉ to each site for the next epoch.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate DPFact on three aspects: 1) eciency based on accu-
racy and communication cost; 2) utility of the phenotype discovery;
and 3) impact of privacy. e evaluation is performed on both
real-world datasets and synthetic datasets.
5.1 Dataset
We evaluated DPFact on one synthetic dataset and two real-world
datasets, MIMIC-III [17] and the CMS DE-SynPUF dataset. Each of
the dataset has dierent sizes, sparsity (i.e., % of non-zero elements),
and skewness in distribution (i.e., some sites have more patients).
MIMIC-III. is is a publicly-available intensive care unit (ICU)
dataset collected from 2001 to 2012. We construct 6 local tensors
with dierent sizes representing patients from dierent ICUs. Each
tensor element represents the number of co-occurrence of diagnoses
and procedures from the same patient within a 30-day time window.
For beer interpretability, we adopt the rule in [19] and select 202
procedures ICD-9 codes and 316 diagnoses codes that have the
highest frequency. e resulting tensor is 40, 662 patients × 202
procedures × 316 diagnoses with a non-zero ratio of 4.0382 × 10−6.
CMS. is is a publicly-available Data Entrepreneurs’ Synthetic
Public Use File (DE-SynPUF) from 2008 to 2010. We randomly
choose 5 samples out of the 20 samples of the outpatient data to
construct 5 local tensors with patients, procedures and diagnoses.
Dierent from MIMIC-III, we make each local tensor the same
size. ere are 82,307 patients with 2,532 procedures and 10,983
diagnoses within a 30-day time window. We apply the same rule
in selecting ICD-9 codes. By concatenating the 5 local tensors, we
obtain a big tensor with 3.1678 × 10−7 non-zero ratio.
Synthetic Dataset. We also construct tensors from synthetic data.
In order to test dierent dimensions and sparsities, we construct
a tensor of size 5000 × 300 × 800 with a sparsity rate of 10−5 and
then horizontally partition it into 5 equal parts.
5.2 Baselines
We compare our DPFact framework with two centralized baseline
methods and an existing state-of-the-art federated tensor factoriza-
tion method as described below.
CP-ALS: A widely used, centralized model that solves tensor de-
composition using an alternating least squares approach. Data from
multiple sources are combined to construct the global tensor.
SGD: A centralized method that solves the tensor decomposition
use the stochastic gradient descent-based approach. is is equiva-
lent to DPFact with a single site and no regularization (T = 1,γ =
0, µ = 0). We consider this a counterpart to the CP-ALS method.
TRIP [20]: A federated tensor factorization framework that en-
forces a shared global model and does not oer any dierential
privacy guarantee. TRIP utilizes the consensus ADMM approach
to decompose the problem into local subproblems.
5.3 Implementation Details
DPFact is implemented in MatlabR2018b with the Tensor Toolbox
Version 2.6 [1] for tensor computing and the Parallel Computing
Toolbox of Matlab. e experiments were conducted on m5.4xlarge
instances of AWS EC2 with 8 workers. For prediction task, we build
the logistic regression model with Scikit-learn library of Python 2.7.
For reproducibility purpose, we made our code publicly available1.
5.4 Parameter Conguration
Hyper-parameter seings include quadratic penalty parameter γ ,
l2,1 regularization term µ, learning rate η, and the input per-epoch,
per-factor matrix privacy budget ρ. e rank R is set to 50 to allow
some site-specic phenotypes to be captured.
5.4.1 adratic penalty parameter γ . e quadratic penalty
term can be viewed as an elastic force between the local factor
matrices and the global factor matrices. Smaller γ allows more ex-
ploration of the local factors but will result in slower convergence.
To balance the trade-o between convergence and stability, we
choose γ = 5 aer grid search through γ = {2, 5, 8, 10}.
5.4.2 l2,1-regularization term µ. We evaluate the performance
of DPFact with dierent µ for dierent ICU types as they dier
in the Lipschitz constants. Smaller µ has minimal eect on the
1hps://github.com/jma78/DPFact.
# of Sites MIMIC-III CMS Synthetic
1 18.73 22.89 1.55
5 93.62 114.42 7.75
10 189.83 228.83 15.50
Table 2: Communication cost of DPFact for dierent num-
ber of sites (Seconds)
column sparsity, as there are no columns that are set to 0, while
higher µ will ”turn o” a large portion of the factors and prevent
DPFact from generating useful phenotypes. Based on gure 4,
we choose µ = {1, 1.8, 3.2, 1.8, 1.5, 0.6} for TSICU, SICU, MICU,
CSRU, CCU, NICU respectively for MIMIC-III to maintain noticeable
dierences in the column magnitude and the exibility to have at
least one unshared column (see Appendix for details). Similarly, we
choose µ = 2 equally for each site for CMS and µ = 0.5 equally for
each site for the synthetic dataset.
5.4.3 Learning rate η. e learning rate η must be the same for
local sites and the parameter server. e optimal η was found aer
grid searching in the range [10−5, 10−1]. We choose 10−2, 10−3, and
10−2 for MIMIC-III, CMS, and synthetic data respectively.
5.4.4 Privacy budget ρ. We choose the per-epoch privacy budget
under the zCDP denition for each factor matrix as ρ = 10−3 for
MIMIC-III, CMS, and synthetic dataset. By eorem 4.1, the total
privacy guarantee is (1.2, 10−4), (1.9, 10−4), and (1.7, 10−4) under
the (ϵ,δ )-DP denition for MIMIC-III, CMS, and synthetic dataset
respectively when DPFact converges (we choose δ to be 10−4).
5.4.5 Number of sites T . To gain more knowledge on how com-
munication cost would be reduced regarding the number of sites,
we evaluate the communication cost when the number of sites
(T ) are increased. To simulate a larger number of sites, we ran-
domly partition the global observed tensor into 1, 5, and 10 sites
for the three datasets. Table 8 shows that the communication cost
of DPFact scales proportionally with the number of sites.
5.5 Eciency
5.5.1 Accuracy. Accuracy is evaluated using the root mean
square error (RMSE) between the global observed tensor and a
horizontal concatenation of each factorized local tensor. Figure 2
illustrates the RMSE as a function of the number of epochs. We
observe that DPFact converges to a smaller RMSE than CP-ALS and
TRIP. SGD achieves the lowest RMSE as DPFact suers some utility
loss by sharing dierentially private intermediary results.
5.5.2 Communication Cost. e communication cost is mea-
sured based on the total number of communicated bytes divided
by the data transfer rate (assumed as 15 MB/second). As CP-ALS
and SGD are both centralized models, only TRIP and DPFact are
compared.
Table 3 summarizes the communication cost on all the datasets.
DPFact reduces the cost by 46.6%, 37.7%, and 20.7% on MIMIC-III,
CMS, and synthetic data, respectively. is is achieved by allowing
more local exploration at each site (multiple passes of the data)
and transmiing fewer auxiliary variables. Moreover, the reduced
communication cost does not result in higher RMSE (see Figure 2).
(a) MIMIC-III: ICU (b) CMS (c) Synthetic
Figure 2: Average RMSE on (a) MIMIC-III, (b) CMS, (c) Synthetic datasets using 5 random initializations.
Algorithm MIMIC-III CMS Synthetic
TRIP 175.26 183.72 9.77
DPFact 93.62 114.42 7.75
Table 3: Communication Cost of DPFact and TRIP (Seconds)
Rank CP-ALS TRIP DPFact
DPFact w/o l2,1 w/o DP
10 0.7516 0.7130 0.7319 0.5189 0.7401
20 0.7573 0.7596 0.7751 0.6886 0.7763
30 0.7488 0.7644 0.7679 0.6977 0.7705
40 0.7603 0.7574 0.7737 0.7137 0.7756
50 0.7643 0.7633 0.7759 0.7212 0.7790
60 0.7648 0.7588 0.7758 0.7312 0.7763
Table 4: Predictive performance (AUC) comparison for (1)
CP-ALS, (2) TRIP, (3) DPFact, (4) DPFact without l2,1-norm
(w/o l2,1), (5) non-private DPFact (w/o DP).
5.6 Utility
e utility of DPFact is measured by the predictive power of the
discovered phenotypes. A logistic regression model is t using the
patients’ membership values (i.e., A[t ]i : , Âi : of size 1×R) as features
to predict in-hospital mortality. We use a 60-40 train-test split
and evaluated the model using area under the receiver operating
characteristic curve (AUC).
5.6.1 Global Paerns. Table 4 shows the AUC for DPFact, CP-
ALS (centralized), and TRIP (distributed) as a function of the rank
(R). From the results, we observe that DPFact outperforms both
baseline methods for achieving the highest AUC. is suggests
that DPFact captures similar global phenotypes as the other two
methods. We note that DPFact has a slightly lower AUC than
CP-ALS for a rank of 10, as the l2,1-regularization eect is not
prominent.
5.6.2 Site-Specific Paerns. Besides achieving the highest pre-
dictive performance, DPFact also can be used to discover site-
specic paerns. As an example, we focus on the neonatal ICU
(NICU) which has a drastically dierent population than the other
5 ICUs. e ability to capture NICU-specic phenotypes can be
seen in the AUC comparison with TRIP (Figure 3(a)). DPFact con-
sistently achieves higher AUC for NICU patients. e importance
of the l2,1-regularization term is also illustrated in Table 4. DP-
Fact with the l2,1-regularization is more stable and achieves higher
AUC compared without the regularization term (µ = 0).
Table 5 illustrates the top 5 phenotypes with respect to the mag-
nitude of the logistic regression coecient (mortality risk related
to the phenotype) for NICU. e phenotypes are named according
to the non-zero procedures and diagnoses. A high λ and prevalence
means this phenotype is common. From the results, we observe that
heart disease, respiration failure, and pneumonia are more com-
mon but less associated with mortality risk (negative coecient).
However, acute kidney injury (AKI) and anemia are less prevalent
and highly associated with death. In particular, AKI has the highest
risk of in-hospital death, which is consistent with other reported
results [32]. Table 6(a) shows an NICU-specic phenotype, which
diers slightly from the corresponding global phenotype showing
in table 6(b).
(a) AUC comparison (b) Factor Match Score (FMS)
Figure 3: (a) Predictive performance (AUC) comparison for
NICU between (1) TRIP, (2) DPFact. (b) Factor Match Score
(FMS) under dierent privacy budget (ϵ).
5.7 Privacy
We investigated the impact of dierential privacy by comparing
DPFact with its non-private version. e main dierence is that
non-private DPFact does not perturb the local feature factor ma-
trices that are transferred to the server. We use the factor match
Phenotypes Coef p-value λ Prevalence
25: Congenital heart de-
fect
-2.1865 0.005 198 34.32
29: Anemia 3.5047 ¡0.001 77 13.22
30: Acute kidney injury 5.8806 ¡0.001 68 23.38
34: Pneumonia -5.1050 ¡0.001 37 37.58
35: Respiratory failure -0.9141 ¡0.001 85 24.40
Table 5: Top 5 representative phenotypes from NICU based
on the factor weights, λr = ‖A:r ‖F ‖B:r ‖F ‖C:r ‖F . Prevalence
is the proportion of patients who have non-zero member-
ship to the phenotype.
(a) NICU-specic Phenotypes discovered by DPFact
Procedures Diagnoses
Cardiac catheterization Ventricular brillation
Insertion of non-drug-eluting coro-
nary artery stent(s)
Unspecied congenital anomaly of
heart
Prophylactic administration of vac-
cine against other disease
Benign essential hypertension
(b) Globally shared phenotype discovered by DPFact
Procedures Diagnoses
Aachment of pedicle or ap gra Rheumatic heart failure
Right heart cardiac catheterization Ventricular brillation
Procedure on two vessels Benign essential hypertension
Other endovascular procedures on
other vessels
Paroxysmal ventricular tachycardia
Nephritis and nephropathy
Insertion of non-drug-eluting coro-
nary artery stent(s)
(c) Globally shared phenotype discovered by non-private DPFact
Procedures Diagnoses
Right heart cardiac catheterization Hypopotassemia
Aachment of pedicle or ap gra Rheumatic heart failure
Excision or destruction of other le-
sion or tissue of heart, open ap-
proach
Benign essential hypertension
Paroxysmal ventricular tachycardia
Systolic heart failure
Table 6: Example of the representative phenotype. (a) NICU-
specic phenotype of Congenital heart defect; (b) and (c) are
the globally shared phenotype of Heart failure, showing the
dierence of DPFact and non-private DPFact.
score (FMS) [5] to compare the similarity between the phenotype
discovered using DPFact and non-private DPFact. FMS dened as:
score(X¯) = 1
R
∑
r
(
1 −
ξr − ξ¯r 
max
{
ξr , ξ¯r
} ) ∏
x=a,b,c
xTr x¯r
‖xr ‖‖x¯r ‖ ,
ξr =
∏
x=a,b,c
‖xr ‖, ξ¯r =
∏
x=a,b,c
‖x¯r ‖
where X¯ = [[A¯, B¯, C¯]] is the estimated factors and X = [[A,B,C]] is
the true factors. xr is the r th column of factor matrices.
We treat the non-private version DPFact factors as the bench-
mark for DPFact factors. Figure 3(b) shows how the FMS changes
with an increase of the privacy budget. As the privacy budget
becomes larger, the FMS increases accordingly and will gradually
approximate 1, which means the discovered phenotypes between
the two methods are equivalent. is result indicates that when a
stricter privacy constraint is enforced, it may negatively impact the
quality of the phenotypes. us, there is a practical need to balance
the trade-o between privacy and phenotype quality.
Table 6 presents a comparison between the top 1 (highest factor
weight λr ) phenotype DPFact-derived phenotype and the closest
phenotype derived by its non-private version. We observe that
DPFact contains several additional noisy procedure and diagnosis
elements than the non-private DPFact version. ese extra elements
are the results of adding noise to the feature factor matrices. is
is also supported in Table 4 as the non-private DPFact has beer
predictive performance than DPFact. us, the output perturbation
process may interfere with the interpretability and meaningfulness
of the derived phenotype. However, there is still some utility from
the DPFact-derived phenotype as experts can still distinguish this
phenotype to be a heart failure phenotype. erefore, DPFact still
retains the ability to perform phenotype discovery.
6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Tensor Factorization
Tensor analysis is an active research topic and has been widely
applied to healthcare data [15, 20, 27], especially for computational
phenotyping. Moreover, several algorithms have been developed
to scale tensor factorization. GigaTensor [18] used MapReduce for
large scale CP tensor decomposition that exploits the sparseness of
the real world tensors. DFacTo [6] improves GigaTensor by explor-
ing properties related to the Khatri-Rao Product and achieves faster
computation time and beer scalability. FlexiFaCT [3] is a scalable
MapReduce algorithm for coupled matrix-tensor decomposition us-
ing stochastic gradient descent (SGD). ADMM has also been proved
to be an ecient algorithm for distributed tensor factorization [20].
However, the above proposed algorithms have the same potential
limitation: the distributed data exhibits the same paern at dierent
local sites. at means each local tensor can be treated as a random
sample from the global tensor. us, the algorithms are unable to
model the scenario where the distribution paern may be dierent
at each sites. is is common in healthcare as dierent units (or
clinics and hospitals) will have dierent patient populations, and
may not exhibit all the computational phenotypes.
6.2 Dierential Private Factorization
Dierential privacy is widely applied to machine learning areas,
especially matrix/tensor factorization, as well as on dierent dis-
tributed optimization frameworks and deep learning problems. Re-
garding tensor decomposition, there are four ways to enforce dier-
ential privacy: input perturbation, output perturbation, objective
perturbation and the gradient perturbation. [16] proposed an ob-
jective perturbation method for matrix factorization in recommen-
dation systems. [22] proposed a new idea that sampling from the
posterior distribution of a Bayesian model can suciently guaran-
tee dierential privacy. [2] compared the four dierent perturbation
method on matrix factorization and drew the conclusion that input
perturbation is the most ecient method that has the least privacy
loss on recommendation systems. [26] is the rst proposed dier-
entially private tensor decomposition work. It proposed a noise
calibrated tensor power method. Our goal in this paper is to develop
a distributed framework where data is stored at dierent sources,
and try to preserve the privacy during knowledge transfer. Nev-
ertheless, these works are based on a centralized framework. [20]
developed a federated tensor factorization framework, but it simply
preserves privacy by avoiding direct patient information sharing,
rather than by applying rigorous dierential privacy techniques.
7 CONCLUSION
DPFact is a distributed large-scale tensor decomposition method
that enforces dierential privacy. It is well-suited for computational
phenotype from multiple sites as well as other collaborative health-
care analysis with multi-way data. DPFact allows data to be stored
at dierent sites without requiring a single centralized location to
perform the computation. Moreover, our model recognizes that the
learned global latent factors need not be present at all sites, allow-
ing the discovery of both shared and site-specic computational
phenotypes. Furthermore, by adopting a communication-ecient
EASGD algorithm, DPFact greatly reduces the communication over-
head. DPFact also successfully tackles the privacy issue under the
distributed seing with limited privacy loss by the application of
zCDP and parallel composition theorem. Experiments on real-world
and synthetic datasets demonstrate that our model outperforms
other state-of-the-art methods in terms of communication cost,
accuracy, and phenotype discovery ability. Future work will focus
on the asynchronization of the collaborative tensor factorization
framework to further optimize the computation eciency.
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A APPENDIX
is section provides supplementary information.
A.1 Lipschitz Constant
Below is the calculation of the Lipschitz constant in objective func-
tion (15), which will be used for calculating β in section 4.2. Since
B[t ] and C[t ] play the same role in the objective function in (15),
we take B[t ] as an example. f (B[t ]) can be rewrien as
f (B[t ]) = 12
O[t ](n) − B[t ]ΠB2F︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
FB
+
γ
2
B[t ] − B2
F︸           ︷︷           ︸
QB
, (20)
where O[t ](n) is the matricization of the local observed tensor O[t ],
ΠB = C[t ]  A[t ]. us f (B[t ]) is the combination of FB and QB .
We provide analysis of Lipschitz continuity of (20) separately for
FB and QB . e analysis for FB could also be adopted into equation
(9) in section 4.1.1.
e gradient ofFB (B[t ]) is calculated as∇FB (B[t ]) = −O[t ](n)ΠB+
B[t ]ΓB , where ΓB = (A[t ]>A[t ]) ∗ (C[t ]>C[t ]). Furthermore, for
any B[t ]1 ,B
[t ]
2 ∈ R
j×n
+ , we have∇FB (B[t ]1 ) − ∇FB (B[t ]2 )F = B[t ]1 ΓB − B[t ]2ΓBF
=
(B[t ]1 − B[t ]2 )ΓBF
≤ ‖ΓB ‖F
B[t ]1 − B[t ]2 F .
(21)
e gradient of QB is calculated as ∇QB (B[t ]) = γB[t ]. Similar
to ∇FB (B[t ]), for any B[t ]1 ,B
[t ]
2 ∈ R
j×n
+ , we have∇FB (B[t ]1 ) − ∇FB (B[t ]2 )F = γB[t ]1 − γB[t ]2 F
=
γ Ij (B[t ]1 − B[t ]2 )F
≤ γ IjF B[t ]1 − B[t ]2 F
(22)
By combining the results in (21) and (22), we thus get theLipschitz
constant of ∇f (B[t ]) as the Frobenius norm of
(A[t ]>A[t ]) ∗ (C[t ]>C[t ]) + γ Ij .
A.2 L2,1 Regularization Parameter
Figure 4 illustrates the eect of choosing dierent value of µ on
the column norm of the patient matrix for each ICUs in MIMIC-
III dataset. We observe that smaller µ has minimal eect on the
column sparsity, as there are no columns that are set to 0. However,
if we set µ to be too high (i.e., µ = {5, 6, 8, 6, 5, 0.9} for each ICU
respectively), then it “turns o” a large portion of the factors and
prevents DPFact from generating useful phenotypes. Based on the
gure, we choose µ = {1, 1.8, 3.2, 1.8, 1.5, 0.6} for TSICU, SICU,
MICU, CSRU, CCU, NICU respectively, as the optimal solution for
MIMIC-III as there are still noticeable dierences in the column
magnitude (i.e, the phenotypes have a natural ordering within each
location) but also provides exibility to have at least one unshared
column (see component 2 and 4).
Phenotypes Coef p-value λ Prevalence
2 1.46 ¡0.001 163 21.67
3: Hypertension -1.53 ¡0.001 249 20.57
6 -1.19 ¡0.001 145 23.53
7 -2.34 ¡0.001 49 18.17
8 2.89 ¡0.001 162 24.31
9 2.88 ¡0.001 116 22.81
14 -1.72 ¡0.001 94 18.25
16 2.29 ¡0.001 79 17.48
17 4.21 ¡0.001 166 21.96
18 3.66 ¡0.001 69 16.79
20 -1.51 ¡0.001 95 20.72
22 2.17 ¡0.001 137 19.19
25: Heart failure -6.56 ¡0.001 278 16.40
30: Acute kidney in-
jury
0.46 ¡0.001 203 26.35
32 1.65 ¡0.001 109 18.73
37 1.42 ¡0.001 116 22.50
42: Gastritis and gas-
troduodenitis
-2.24 ¡0.001 187 22.88
47: Cardiac surgery -2.94 ¡0.001 223 16.55
49 2.91 ¡0.001 113 22.73
50: Chronic is-
chemic heart disease
1.38 ¡0.001 207 27.45
Table 7: Logistic regression results for phenotype selection
# of Sites MIMIC-III CMS Synthetic
1 18.73 22.89 1.55
5 93.62 114.42 7.75
10 189.83 228.83 15.50
Table 8: Communication cost of DPFact for dierent num-
ber of sites (Seconds)
A.3 Phenotype Selection
Table 7 provides information in supplementary for phenotype se-
lection of the overall paern. Similar to table 5, among the 50
phenotypes generated by DPFact, we selected 20 phenotypes that
are statistically signicant for mortality prediction. We reported
6 representative phenotypes which has the highest factor weights
(λ).
Figure 4: Norm of each ICU with dierent regularization term µ
(y-axis is the norm, x-axis is the rank)
